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European environmental policy is currently undergoing a major transition. At 
the supranational level, both the Maastricht Treaty and the Fifth Environmental 
Action Programme herald a new era dominated by the search for more flexible 
and efficient instruments to replace traditional forms of regulation. At the 
national level, this search has been underway for some time in many of the 
respective member states of the European Union (EU).
This paper introduces the main issues surrounding the use of new 
instruments, and offers an overview of their successes and failures. The first 
section briefly reviews the dominance and shortcomings of the traditional 
command and control approach in European environmental policy. Section two 
has two parts, the first identifies the various types of new instrument considered 
throughout this volume and discusses their reputed advantages over command 
and control; the second identifies the domestic and international forces which 
have been instrumental in getting new instruments put into practice. The third 
section opens with a discussion of various criteria for gauging the effectiveness 
of new instruments. A comparative analysis of member state experience then 
highlights factors which facilitated successful application of each type of 
instrument, as well as those which have undermined their effectiveness. To gain 
a better perspective on developments within the EU, this section concludes with 
a brief examination of how new instruments have been used in the United States 
and Japan. The final section draws out some of the broader implications this 
volume’s findings hold for the future of environmental policy design, the nature 
of governance within the EU, and the prospects for maintaining global free 
trade.
Command and Control
Originating in the late 1960s, the first generation of environmental policies 
throughout the member states of the EC primarily followed the so-called 
“command and control” approach. Command and control is characterised by 
direct regulation: the government prescribes uniform environmental standards 
across large regions, mandates the abatement methods required to meet such 
standards, licenses production sites which adopt the required methods, and 
assures compliance through monitoring and sanctions.
The papers in this series make clear that the prevalence of command and 
control instruments built up throughout the 1970s generally reflected a north- 
south “green” divide (see also Collier and Golub 1997). Germany and the 
Netherlands boast particularly strong environmental records, and had extensive 



























































































1970s. Over the years each of these states set and tightened multitudes of 
emission standards based on what could be achieved by using the “best 
available technology” (BAT).
The first generation of British environmental policy incorporated greater 
discretion and flexibility, but the corpus of legislation built up since the 
nineteenth century was grounded firmly in the command and control tradition. 
Although less demanding than BAT, British regulation to control air pollution 
set emission limits according to the “best practicable means” and periodically 
tightened these limits in line with technological developments (McCormick 
1991, Golub 1996a). For water, direct regulation made authorities responsible 
for ensuring the “wholesomeness” of rivers, frequently taken to be World 
Health Organisation (WHO) standards. Industrial discharge consents were then 
generally structured so that overall pollution levels would not exceed WHO 
recommendations. Command and control also pervaded Belgian environmental 
policy prior to the early 1980s. While these laws did not require the use of BAT, 
a variety of direct regulations set national and regional quality objectives in 
each sector (air, water, waste etc.).
While the four papers exploring environmental instruments in northern 
Europe highlight variations within a group of states sharing strong green 
traditions and extensive bodies of command and control regulation, the papers 
on Italy and Spain reaffirm the north-south dichotomy, illustrating that 
environmental protection has always occupied a less auspicious position in the 
highly fragmented policymaking of Mediterranean states (see also Collier and 
Golub 1997, La Spina and Sciortino 1993). Nevertheless, while regulation 
devised in the 1960s and 1970s was extremely patchy in southern Europe, 
amounting to no more than a handful of air and water laws, it too reflected a 
command and control approach.
In many cases the direct regulation found within European states arose from 
external constraints, as the expanding corpus of environmental policy adopted 
at the EC level since 1973 also relied heavily on command and control. EC 
regulations included many provisions requiring existing industrial installations 
to curtail pollution in accordance with uniform emissions standards, and 
requiring all new plants to apply Best Available Technology.1
• BAT was included, for example, in Directive 83/513 on cadmium, and Directive 82/176 on 
mercury discharges. In other cases, EC law required only the application of best available 
technology not entailing excessive costs (BATNEEC), for example Directive 84/360 on air 
pollution. While many EC laws reflected this type of command and control approach, it would 




























































































Particularly in Spain and Italy, first generation national command and 
control instruments were put in place to satisfy the requirements of EC law, 
filling a pre-existing regulatory void. But even in the north, EC environmental 
legislation sometimes reshaped or solidified previous national measures. 
Prescribing uniform emissions standards and abatement technology throughout 
a state or throughout the EC, with attendant economic costs, was considered by 
many an equitable response to problems of upstream-downstream pollution, 
preferable to simply setting quality targets which privileged those states, 
regions or firms fortunate enough to avoid cross-border effluent problems. 
Closely bound up with the emphasis on uniformity and technical solutions was 
the perception that allowing industry in peripheral, isolated or sparsely 
populated regions to meet environmental objectives at relatively less cost than 
those in other parts of the EC would constitute an unfair competitive advantage 
which would distort the common market.
Two decades of experience revealed a number of regulatory failures 
associated with the traditional command and control approach. These 
shortcomings fall into three categories: economic inefficiency, environmental 
ineffectiveness, and democratic illegitimacy (see Tietenberg 1988, Eckersley 
1995a).
By its very nature, command and control tends towards economic 
inefficiency by imposing uniform reduction targets and technologies which 
ignore the variable pollution abatement costs facing individual firms. In 
practice, marginal costs of pollution reduction vary widely amongst industries, 
depending on factors such as age and location of plant. From an efficiency 
perspective, the result is that some firms regulate too much, others not enough. 
Installing state of the art equipment or cutting emissions by a specified amount 
(for example, by three tonnes of sulphur per month) will necessarily be easier 
and cheaper for some plants than for others. While a designated overall level of 
pollution reduction could thus be achieved at less overall cost if abatement 
efforts were concentrated where marginal costs were lowest, command and 
control discourages such efficiency.
In some cases, command and control also introduces inefficiency by 
eschewing environmental quality objectives in favour of uniform emission 
standards. Consider the case of two identical firms, one located in a sparsely 
populated area, the other in a city. Because of the differing capacities of their 
local ecosystems to absorb additional units of pollution, the firms face variable
member states. The nature of EC directives as well as certain political considerations has 




























































































abatement costs and would therefore have to make drastically different 
reductions in their emissions to meet the same quality targets. Uniform 
emissions standards and BAT produce inefficiency by imposing identical costs- 
-not allowed to take advantage of its favourable location, the rural firm is forced 
to overregulate and jeopardise its economic performance; at the same time, even 
tougher standards and penalties beyond BAT might actually be required for the 
urban firm to meet acceptable pollution levels or compensate for environmental 
damage.
Finally, command and control contributes to inefficiency because it stifles 
incentives to reduce emissions beyond mandated levels and to develop 
innovative pollution control technology. Rather, the prescription, license and 
monitor approach generates a static situation where, having installed a 
designated technology or achieved a certain level of emissions, polluters would 
only incur unilateral costs and competitive disadvantages from further 
reductions. BAT rules are particularly effective in stifling innovation, because 
firms are forced to adopt expensive equipment regardless of whether other, and 
sometimes more radical, solutions might be found at less cost (von Weizacker 
1990:202).
Command and control is not only an expensive approach to pollution 
reduction, but one which, according to many analysts, has also reached the 
limits of its environmental effectiveness. To a large extent the two are related, 
as adoption of new and increasingly stringent emissions limits and technologies 
intended to safeguard the environment encounter intense political resistance 
when seen as excessively costly. But regulatory failures also plague current 
policies, for instance when fiscal austerity forces governments to curtail the 
expensive oversight and enforcement mechanisms vital to command and 
control, resulting in rampant non-compliance.
A third criticism levelled at the command and control approach is that it 
lacks democratic legitimacy (Eckersley 1995b, Dryzek 1995). Regulatory 
bodies responsible to the public for identifying environmental problems, 
standard setting, determining what constitutes the best available technology, 
and enforcing compliance develop close and often dependent relationships with 
industry because of the latter's detailed knowledge of, and direct interest in, 
polluting activities and potential abatement options. As currently constructed, 
command and control instruments fail to alleviate the information asymmetries 
which effectively exclude the general public and environmental interest groups 




























































































thereby shaping or blocking environmental policies in accordance with their 
own economic self-interests.2
The shift towards new instruments
An arsenal of new instruments
The limitations and regulatory failures of the traditional command and control 
approach have sparked a search at both the national and EU level for a second 
generation of instruments which promise greater flexibility, efficiency and 
effectiveness.3 States have experimented with an impressive range of new tools, 
some of which might be classified as “economic” and “suasive” instruments 
(OECD 1994b: 16). The former category includes several types of 
environmental taxes and charges, comprehensive “green tax reform”, tradable 
pollution permit systems, government subsidies for environmental 
improvement, and deposit/refund schemes. The latter group consists of 
ecolabels, ecoaudits, and voluntary environmental agreements. A third class of 
new instruments which receives less attention in this volume focuses primarily 
on altering liability and insurance rules in a manner which benefits the 
environment. An extensive literature discusses the economic theory 
underpinning this wide range of potential new tools, as well as their individual 
merits (Tietenberg 1988, Helm and Pearce 1990, Hahn 1993, Teubner et al 
1994, HoL 1993).4
New instruments are intended to provide the efficiency and positive 
incentives which command and control lacks. Taxes and charges levied on each 
unit of emission force firms to internalise the costs of their pollution, thereby 
better achieving the Polluter Pays Principle, but they also allow industry the 
freedom to optimise its reduction methods. Tradable permits and voluntary 
agreements achieve the same end by setting long-term environmental goals 
without prescribing specific abatement technology. Latitude to find the most
2 The theoretical underpinnings of the capture model were developed by Stigler (1971) and 
generalised by Peltzman (1976). For evidence of capture in various policy sectors, including 
the environment, see Francis (1993), Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1995), McCormick (1991).
2 The deregulation debate in Europe and the US, and its relation to environmental policy, is 
also discussed in the two accompanying volumes of this series (Golub 1998b, Collier 1997).
4 Many aspects of the debate over new environmental instruments stem from the seminal 




























































































cost-effective means of reducing pollution improves static efficiency, but more 
importantly it yields dynamic efficiency by providing incentives for firms to 
pursue constant pollution reduction and technological innovation (Carraro and 
Siniscalco 1993, Eckersley 1995b:9, EC 1992, 1993, 1994). Each successive 
reduction in emissions saves the firm from paying tax, allows it to sell its 
tradable permits to “dirtier” competitors, or allows it to meet future targets at 
lower cost.
Compared to command and control, ecolabels and ecoaudits also 
substantially reduce the regulatory burden on firms because they prescribe 
neither targets nor technologies. Rather, these instruments generate incentives 
for pollution reduction by harnessing the market power of “green 
consumerism”. Armed with the information which labels and audits provide 
about the content and manufacturing process of products, and about the internal 
environmental performance of firms, consumers will be able to express their 
preference for environmentally friendly behaviour, and firms will be forced to 
respond accordingly or else lose market share.
Ecoaudits also provide several other potential advantages over command 
and control. First, industry expects to improve relations with green consumers, 
banks and insurance companies by publicising official certification of their 
environmental commitment. Environmental audits can also reveal new 
knowledge about a firm’s production process, and they often illuminate means 
of improving efficiency and curtailing consumption of natural resources, both of 
which result in substantial savings. Compared with traditional forms of direct 
regulation and BAT rules, ecoaudits can also introduce a desirable dynamic 
element, providing even the worst polluters with positive incentives for future 
environmental improvement.
Proponents of new instruments suggest that governments also stand to profit 
by reducing their reliance on command and control, because market-based and 
suasive tools require less expenditure on implementation and oversight. 
Furthermore, green taxes might represent a politically popular and lucrative 
source of government revenue.
Another important advantage attributed to new instruments is that they 
decrease regulatory capture and lend legitimacy to environmental policy by 
substituting direct public involvement for command and control's infamous 
“poacher and gamekeeper” relationship between industry and regulatory bodies. 
Labels, audits and ecotaxes allow consumers to decide for themselves the value 
they place on environmental improvement. Voluntary agreements also have the 




























































































industry in close consultation rather than open confrontation with government. 
Widening the range of parties participating in the consultation process to 
include green groups and local community officials further enhances the 
legitimacy of eventual decisions. Japanese experience with voluntary 
agreements suggests that industry is willing to disclose important information 
necessary to set ambitious targets because they consider them economically 
feasible, and also because they benefit from the trust developed with local 
communities (Rehbinder 1994).
The widespread appeal of new instruments
The use of new instruments varies widely amongst member states, as do the 
reasons for their introduction. This working papers series illustrate the range of 
domestic and international pressures animating the shift away from command 
and control: the ascendance of new economic paradigms and political 
ideologies, demands from industrial groups, the agendas of certain political 
parties, pressure from environmental or academic organisations, and the 
requirements of EC law. While in most cases all three of the above 
considerations (cost, effectiveness and legitimacy) influenced policy change, 
each author has attempted to identify more precisely the timing of reform and 
the interplay of domestic and international politics which yielded new tools. For 
example, academics and think tanks have played a particularly important role in 
Britain and Belgium, while EC law has been the driving force in Spain and 
Italy.
Industry groups have been instrumental in placing new instruments on the 
political agenda. Their primary concern, not surprisingly, is that the ability of 
EC firms to compete in the global economy requires lightening the “burden of 
regulation” (EC 1995:10 part 2) which poses unnecessary “costs, rigidities and 
obstacles to innovation” (EC 1995:ii). Industry supports most alternatives to 
direct regulation, arguing that they will improve environmental protection while 
reducing compliance costs, but has expressed a strong preference for suasive 
instruments (information schemes and voluntary programmes) over other types 
of new tools (EC 1995:2,52 part 2, UNICE 1993, but see Hahn 1995:151-2).
But industry has also exhibited some ambivalence towards the shift, in part 
through sheer hypocrisy, but also because of the uncertainty and transaction 
costs they face by abandoning what is often a well understood regulatory 
approach over which they exercise considerable influence. In some cases, 




























































































motives, for instance when dealing with free-rider problems or when the 
interests of large and small firms diverge.5
An interesting theme which recurs throughout the country studies is the 
gradual conversion of environmental NGOs and Green Parties, from an initial 
position of scepticism regarding new instruments towards one of guarded 
enthusiasm. In Germany, the Green Party was split in the late 1970s and early 
1980s between pragmatic and fundamentalist factions, only the former of which 
supported gradual reform and experimentation with new tools. Over time, this 
group and their agenda gained control of the Green Party as fundamentalist 
objectors were marginalised (WP RSC 98/14). Italian NGOs resisted new tools 
in the 1970s, fearing that they would provide insufficient environmental 
protection and objecting on ethical grounds to what they viewed as a “right to 
pollute”, but have since given full support to new instruments as a means of 
overcoming regulatory failures of command and control (WP RSC 98/18). UK 
NGOs have consistently opposed new instruments, but seem recently to have 
accepted them as inevitable and turned their attention towards ways in which 
the regressive effects of green taxes might be alleviated.
But enthusiasm has its limits, and a number of NGOs have cautioned that a 
rush towards new instruments should not lose sight of the fact that reregulation, 
rather than indiscriminate deregulation is required (EEB 1995:4). The highly 
publicised Molitor report on “legislative simplification” in the EU (EC 1995) 
received a particularly cool reception from environmental NGOs, who feared 
that it heralded a reckless repatriation of environmental competences at the 
expense of necessary supranational legislation (EEB 1995). It should be noted, 
however, that the Report’s recommendations even elicited a dissenting opinion 
within the ‘group of experts’ which admonished the Commission to replace 
direct regulation with new instruments on a selective basis in order to safeguard 
the environment, rather than to fulfil an ideological deregulatory objective.6
International pressures have also played an important part. Since the early 
1970s, the OECD has consistently promoted widespread use of new
5 Some authors in the public choice tradition have suggested that firms prefer direct regulation 
lo new instruments because it serves as a barrier to market entry and therefore results in higher 
profits (Buchanan and Tullock 1975). Similarly, large firms might prefer stringent 
environmental regulations to block the entry of smaller competitors (Grant 1997).
6 A dissenting opinion which deplored the Molitor report’s treatment of environmental issues 
basically as obstacles to economic activity was expressed by Pierre Camiti, an MEP and 
former General Secretary of the Italian Confederation of free labour unions, and Goran 




























































































environmental instruments (Eckersley 1995b:9-10, OECD 1975, 1989). The 
supranational institutions of the EC, particularly the Commission and European 
Parliament, have expressed similar overwhelming support, and new tools figure 
prominently in the Community’s most recent (fifth) Environmental Action 
Programme (EP 1994:12-14, EC 1992:6-7, 1993, 1994). Commission 
documents cite many advantages of new instruments over the traditional 
command and control approach, including their greater flexibility, their cost- 
effectiveness, and the incentives they provide firms to internalise the negative 
externalities associated with pollution. Moreover, the shift away from command 
and control provides a greater sensitivity for the varying absorption capacity of 
regional ecosystems, the exploitation of which, according to the Commission, 
constitutes an “entirely legitimate source of comparative advantage” (EC 
1992:5, EC 1996b:7,10).
Despite its enthusiastic support, however, the EU has been less successful in 
adopting new tools at the supranational level than it has been in encouraging 
national experimentation with a variety of market-based and suasive 
instruments. The effectiveness of these instruments and the problem of 
accommodating national diversity within a common EU framework is taken up 
in the next section.
Gauging the effectiveness of new instruments
There is widespread agreement that the effectiveness of new instruments 
depends largely on their ability to harness market forces in favour of 
environmental protection. There is considerably less agreement, however, on 
what constitutes an acceptable level of pollution and the extent to which market 
forces should be entrusted to determine this for society. How one answers these 
questions fundamentally alters the optimal design of any instrument and in part 
determines the appropriate standards forjudging its success.
The so-called “free market environmentalism” (FME) debate (Eckersley 
1993) exemplifies the competing philosophies amongst proponents of new 
instruments. Supporters of FME favour reducing pollution to an “optimal” 
level—defined as the amount of reduction which consumers are willing to pay 
for once the full social costs of negative externalities are reflected in market 
prices-while their opponents advocate pollution levels consistent with 
sustainable growth. The latter levels are far lower than what a market 
equilibrium would render, and therefore depend on purposeful government 




























































































espoused by conservative or libertarian American think tanks (Anderson and 
Leal 1991, Smith and Jeffreys 1993).
The extreme FME position enjoys little support throughout the EU. Rather, a 
broad consensus of actors advocates re-regulation rather than deregulation 
because a totally “free” market misallocates natural resources and produces 
inadequate incentives to prevent environmental degradation.7 The major players 
accept the proposition, which Weale suggests “is so banal as to require little 
justification” (Weale 1993:158), that “the philosophy underlying [new] 
instruments is that the market should be used for economic efficiency purposes 
in a merely instrumental way in order to achieve environmental policy goals 
that continue to be set by the state” (Rehbinder 1994:147). Even the Molitor 
report advocates that new tools should “be designed to achieve a required level 
of quality” expressed as targets set by government (EC 1995:14).
This suggests that the design and effectiveness of new environmental 
instruments should be judged on three criteria: first, how well they curtail 
pollution to levels consistent with sustainable development; second, the savings 
they render in compliance costs; third, the extent to which they enhance the 
legitimacy of environmental policymaking. These criteria mirror the 
shortcomings of conventional command and control regulation. As the papers 
make clear, however, these criteria are largely independent and frequently 
conflictual. Moreover, their order of importance is ranked differently by various 
interested parties.
Green taxes and subsidies
Environmental taxes on polluting activities can take many forms, and are 
designed to raise revenue, alter the behaviour of polluters, or both. The most 
widespread use of charges in the EC has been simply to raise cash or to cover 
the operating costs of treatment plants. Revenue raising taxes have been used by 
most states, in both the north and south, to finance treatment plants and cover 
administrative costs of controlling water, air and waste pollution.
In contrast to revenue raising taxes, incentive taxes seek to encourage 
environmentally friendly production and consumption patterns. Differential tax 
rates (for example the “fuel escalator” in the UK) have been widely used,
7 Markets invariably fail to provide public goods, neglect negative externalities in prices, and 





























































































particularly to encourage greater use of unleaded petrol and low sulphur fuel 
oil. Tax differentials have also been established, mostly in the northern member 
states, to subsidise the purchase of cars which meet stringent emissions 
standards several years before these standards take effect. Five member states 
have already adopted C 02 taxes, while others, including Italy, are conditioning 
theirs on adoption of a similar instrument at the EU level. British and Italian 
charges on waste deposited in landfill constitute an interesting new example of 
green incentive taxation, and many of the papers identify a range of other 
proposed environmental incentive taxes, for instance vehicle taxes and 
motorway tolls in the UK, and a sustainable tourism tax in Italy.
One of the broadest and most ambitious attempts at green incentive taxation 
was made by Belgium in 1993. As Deketelaere explains, the “ecotax” was 
intended to alter consumer behaviour substantially, over a wide range of 
products, but industry resistance and poor initial design undermined its 
implementation and has partly limited its effectiveness. Nevertheless, re-use of 
packaging, batteries and cameras has increased, suggesting that industry 
responded to provisions in the tax which offered them exemptions for 
establishing recycling systems (WP RSC 98/16). Like Belgium, taxes have been 
used to support recycling not only in many of the northern member states, but 
also in Spain and Italy, partly as a means of implementing the EC Directive on 
Packaging Waste.
When taken together, do all of these individual taxes amount to a substantial 
“greening” of national tax systems? Unfortunately not. In 1993, environmental 
taxes contributed only 1.5% of the total taxes raised in the EU while energy 
taxes comprised 5.3%, and only the latter has risen noticeably since 1980 (EEA 
1996:24-26). In fact, for Italy and the UK, the proportion of total tax revenue 
provided by environmental and natural resource taxes was significantly higher 
in 1970 than in 1990 (EEA 1996:51). Moreover, the modesty of these figures 
does not reveal the full extent of the problem. Existing revenue raising taxes do 
not always fully cover the operating costs of treatment plants, and even when 
they do, cost recovery by itself does not indicate that sufficient pollution 
reduction is taking place. Britain, for example does not tax the actual volume of 
pollution treated. In Spain, water taxes have generally failed-many firms and 
municipalities have never paid, and many regions have simply not implemented 
the tax provisions (WP RSC 98/17). And incentive taxes, even when 
implemented, fall far short of inducing producer and consumer behaviour 
consistent with sustainable development. Clearly a much more aggressive and 




























































































Although many states are considering comprehensive environmental tax 
reform, and five have established special tax commissions for this purpose 
(Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden), it remains an elusive goal. 
For one thing, states have not dismantled the myriad of subsidies and levies 
which favour environmentally harmful activities and extemalisation of pollution 
costs, such as the use of dirty coal, airline fuel, and pesticides (WP RSC 98/22, 
EC 1996). These cases illustrate the importance of dealing with environmentally 
harmful activities which currently go untaxed.
Widespread use of green taxes has also been plagued by two important 
distributional problems—the fear of eroding economic competitiveness and the 
regressive nature of certain taxes (EEA 1996:33-34, OECD 1994a, Smith 1995). 
To deal with regressiveness, many national tax schemes incorporate cut-off 
points and exemptions, so that the poorer segments of society are not deprived 
of essential goods such as water and electricity. Similarly, Italian energy taxes 
vary substantially according to region, thereby offsetting regressive impacts in 
the south (WP RSC 98/18). Failing to incorporate such mechanisms can have a 
high political price. A British proposal to raise the level of VAT on fuel was 
defeated mainly because it would have imposed disproportionate costs on lower 
income households, and the new Labour government has pledged to reduce or 
eliminate this tax.
Issues of economic competitiveness have always played a central role in the 
formation of environmental policy at both the national and EC level (Golub 
1998b), and now look set to occupy an equally pivotal position within the new 
generation of environmental instruments, particularly green taxes.8 As 
mentioned previously, while industrial groups have been vocal advocates of a 
shift away from command and control for economic reasons, they have 
frequently pleaded that green taxes would merely increase their production 
costs relative to competitors, resulting in lost market share, higher 
unemployment, depressed growth, and stifled investment.
The inability to resolve distribution and competitiveness issues amongst 
twelve (now fifteen) member states, combined with unanimous voting 
requirements and considerations of subsidiarity, has prevented the adoption of 
green taxes at the EU level, the deadlocked carbon tax proposal serving as the 
primary example (WP RSC 98/22, see also Heller 1998, Golub 1996b). Unable 
to muster sufficient political support for supranational legislation, the
* Several of other volumes of this series deal specifically with economic competitiveness and 




























































































Commission has explored ways of allowing member states greater latitude to 
implement their own new instruments (see below).
Advocates of ambitious green laws deny this presumed negative relationship 
between environmental standards and economic competitiveness, and suggest 
instead that stringent environmental laws, when properly designed, actually 
promote the competitive advantage of firms-the so-called “win-win” thesis 
(Golub 1998a). This claim is also a central element of the “ecological 
modernisation” paradigm (Weale 1992). Two of the fundamental arguments 
offered in support of the win-win hypothesis have been that first, because new 
instruments exhibit proper design, they are more cost-effective than traditional 
regulatory tools, and therefore encourage more efficient use of resources and 
lower production costs; secondly, their design also generates incentives for 
investment in environmental research and development, the fruits of which can 
then be sold to competitors, enabling ‘first movers’ within the EC to capture the 
lucrative global market for pollution abatement technology and services (EC 
1992). The Commission has gone as far as to suggest that “a stronger reliance 
on market based instruments is the key” to the success of sustainable 
development and of efforts to construct a positive relationship between 
economic growth and the environment (EC 1994:2). A win-win strategy has 
also underpinned green tax proposals in several member states, including Italy 
and the UK.
Even amongst advocates of new environmental instruments, however, 
opinion is divided over how to design green taxes which will enhance rather 
than undermine economic competitiveness. The most pervasive line of thinking 
suggests that in order to resolve distribution problems, offset costs and spur tech 
innovation and diffusion, it is essential that the proceeds of such taxes be 
earmarked for specific uses, rather than increasing the overall level of taxation 
(EC 1996, OECD 1994a, Anderson 1994, EEA 1996:34-36). Revenue can be 
funnelled directly back to firms in the form of research and development 
subsidies, or can be used to maintain “fiscal neutrality” whereby the 
government retains its overall revenue level while cutting the rates of other 
taxes payable by firms, such as those on labour and profit. Proponents of this 
view argue that C 02 taxes, for example, fail without such R&D subsidies 
(Carraro and Siniscalco 1993).
Experience from the Netherlands illustrates the controversy over alternative 
uses of green tax revenue. Despite flowing into the general budget, Dutch water 
and fuel levies have proven effective in reducing pollution (WP RSC 98/15). 
But Liefferink notes that this success might be a product of exceptional 




























































































from targeted use of the tax revenue. It is thus not surprising that earmarking in 
these fields is now under consideration. Interestingly, the Dutch C 02 tax, which 
lacks earmarking, has yielded only a 1% reduction in emissions (EEA 1996). 
Moreover, Dutch industry has demanded that all new environmental charges 
should be returned to them in one form or another.
Another way to avoid eroding economic competitiveness is simply to 
exempt industry from paying green taxes. This became a centrepiece of the EU 
carbon-tax proposal, and existing or planned carbon taxes in most member 
states also include provisions exempting energy-intensive sectors which would 
have been hardest hit (Netherlands, Italy, Germany) (EEA 1996). Such 
exemptions diminish political opposition from the business community, but 
exact a corresponding environmental price as the most polluting industries 
escape taxation and thus avoid internalising the full social costs of their actions.
Closely related to recycled tax revenue, another new instrument for 
improving environmental protection is for governments to provide firms with 
subsidies in the form of grants and low interest loans, which are used to 
purchase clean technology or acquire environmental management expertise. 
While an earlier OECD report found green subsidies generally negligible 
(OECD 1990), other studies have concluded that outside of the cohesion states, 
subsidies are substantial and have risen since the early 1980s (Clement 1995). 
Contributions in this series suggest a mixed picture. In Belgium, subsidies are 
present but negligible, while in Spain, the government has channelled funding 
for research and development into clean technology. And in the UK, which 
generally eschews subsidies, a fossil fuel levy encourages the use of “clean” 
energy sources. However, it has received mixed reviews because 90% of the 
funds have gone towards nuclear energy production.
Green taxes linked with subsidies might offer an attractive form of new 
instrument, but there are serious obstacles to this approach. Most importantly, 
the levying of national environmental taxes, the introduction of differentiated 
taxes, and the earmarked use of tax revenue each have the potential to violate 
EU and GATT/WTO laws designed to maintain the common market and free 
international trade (Golub 1998b, Vogel 1998, Esty 1994). Depending on their 
design, green taxes can function as discriminatory barriers against foreign firms 
and products, and the recycling of tax revenue can contravene rules on state aid 
and competition. This becomes particularly worrying if, as many have 
suggested, the success of green taxes and of win-win scenarios depends on 
completely offsetting the cost of environmental charges with earmarked revenue 
and subsidies. In light of the potential conflict between environmental and 




























































































devising guidelines which will serve as a legal framework in which member 
states might experiment with green taxes without violating EU law (see also 
Grabitz and Zacker 1989). Whether such rules survive WTO scrutiny remains to 
be seen.
Compared to command and control measures, do green taxes deliver a 
reduction in administrative costs as advocates suggest? As with their 
contribution to environmental improvement, experience reveals less than 
spectacular results. The margin for cost savings is reduced substantially when 
one recognises that setting appropriate objectives and charges for new 
instruments in a deregulated climate demands the same level of information 
about firms, consumers, and environmental degradation as devising BAT and 
other command and control standards (Heyvaert 1997, Weale 1993). 
Furthermore, green taxes require oversight, monitoring, and enforcement 
mechanisms appropriate for dealing simultaneously with the environmental 
behaviour of industries, consumers and households. Sometimes sufficient 
mechanisms are already in place from previous command and control laws. But 
not always, and environmental tax regimes entail substantial expenditure when 
new administrative structures must be designed or old ones reconfigured. Under 
certain circumstances, oversight of BAT installation might actually prove an 
easier and more cost-effective approach (Jacobs 1995:58, EEA 1996:39). To 
take two examples from the country studies in this series, the Belgian ecotax 
cost more to construct and oversee than it has yielded in revenue (WP RSC 
98/16). And until the full introduction of water metering in the UK, regulators 
will clearly possess insufficient information to levy and enforce incentive taxes 
(WP RSC 98/13).
Voluntary Agreements
New instruments can also take the form of ‘voluntary’ agreements, whereby 
governments enter into negotiations with industry over the extent and timing of 
feasible environmental improvement, without mandating any particular 
pollution abatement method. Also known as negotiated agreements or 
covenants, these instruments have been used in most member states-to meet EC 
packaging waste goals, to reduce C 02 and S02 emissions, to phase-out CFCs, 
and to improve energy efficiency-but are particularly prevalent in the 
Netherlands, with its strong tradition of consensual politics (WP RSC 98/15).
Proponents contend that compared to command and control, voluntary 
agreements provide flexibility, cost savings, and a sense of regulatory 
legitimacy, in exchange for which firms will agree to more ambitious 




























































































design. Studies suggest that an absence of essential provisions has rendered 
50% of Dutch covenants ineffective, while many agreements in the UK suffer 
from these same deficiencies (WP RSC 98/13 and 98/15). Spain has also made 
use of voluntary agreements, but it is too early to judge their economic or 
environmental results (WP RSC 98/17).
Successful voluntary agreements, and Biekart discusses quite a few, share 
four design characteristics (WP RSC 98/19). First, they must contain 
substantive commitments-quantifiable environmental targets and timetables 
rather than ambiguous industrial promises to eventually reduce pollution. 
Second, there must be a “stick behind the door”—the threat of direct regulation 
if industry fails to meet the covenant’s environmental objectives. Third, both the 
negotiating process which leads to an agreement and its subsequent 
implementation must be transparent in order to guarantee enforcement as well 
as legitimacy amongst the maximum number of concerned parties. Fourth, 
voluntary agreements should be legally binding.
In many cases, however, agreements do not include these characteristics. 
Substantial information deficits have hindered the effectiveness of many 
agreements, and there is little evidence that the situation is set to improve-less 
than 1% of firms publish annual environmental reports, and industry opposes 
the creation of pollution registers (WP RSC 98/19, see also EC 1995:17). A 
major problem with previous agreements, including several in the Netherlands 
and the UK, has been the exclusion of NGOs from all negotiations, or their 
restriction to early stages of discussion (WP RSC 98/13 and 98/15, EC 
1996a:28). As Deketelaere points out, without full access by all interested 
parties, industry domination (and withholding) of information biases the 
“agreement” against environmental protection (WP RSC 98/16).
What accounts for the large number of agreements lacking one or more of 
Biekart’s essential characteristics? A number of political and legal 
considerations have played a part. The disappointing results from previous 
‘gentlemens’ agreements did encourage many EC states (including Germany, 
the Netherlands and Belgium) to shift towards a more legal approach (WP RSC 
98/14 and 98/16, EC 1996a:23-24,28). In the UK, a similar evolution has 
occurred in the area of pesticide control (Baggott 1986:64). Despite the 
environmental attractiveness of greater legal formality, however, such 
agreements have dubious political viability because industrial groups view them 
from a position of mixed motives: firms welcome legally binding agreements 
because they prevent free riding, but nevertheless remain sceptical, fearing that 
legality sacrifices industry discretion over the timing and means of achieving 




























































































insurmountable, as seen in Flanders, where not a single agreement has been 
concluded since they became legally binding in 1994 (WP RSC 98/16).
The legal nature of an agreement affects government actions as well as those 
of firms. For industrial groups, the attractiveness of voluntary agreements also 
depends on the government’s ability to forego future regulations for a set period 
of time, a promise frequently made but a legal power which remains very much 
contested (EC 1996a:26, Rehbinder 1994). EU legislation injects additional 
uncertainty, in that BAT requirements, new standards, and other disruptions to 
investment schedules can enter ‘through the backdoor’ despite government 
assurances, undermining industry’s reasons for concluding an agreement in the 
first place. Belgian agreements, for instance, specifically allow for new rules 
imposed by Brussels (WP RSC 98/16).
While the lack of targets, transparency, potential regulation and legality 
explains the failure of many agreements, several other problems have also 
emerged. One is the difficulty of gauging ‘baselines’—the amount of pollution 
reduction firms would achieve by themselves absent a voluntary agreement.9 
Underestimating the baseline will lead to relatively lax targets compatible with 
status quo trends and ‘business as usual’. This offers minimal environmental 
improvement, certainly much less than what technology would allow.
Another problem concerns the scope for technological innovation and cost 
savings provided by voluntary agreements. Have agreements allowed industry 
greater flexibility over the means of reducing pollution, lowered their 
compliance costs and spurred development of clean technology? The answer is 
difficult to determine, particularly when some covenants retain provisions 
requiring firms to adopt a certain type of technology; a sure recipe for stifled 
innovation according to some (Carraro and Galeotti 1995). On the positive side, 
Dutch chemical covenants retain BATNEEC but provide greater flexibility on 
the timing of its implementation. Several companies estimate that they have 
saved 10% in administrative costs.
As yet there have been no voluntary agreements concluded at the EU level, 
although the Commission claims that they could be used in many areas. Instead, 
much like the case with green taxes, the Commission has developed an EU 
framework which encourages greater use of voluntary agreements within the
9 Problems related to calculating baselines, or ‘benchmarking’, also arise with green tax 
schemes (OECD 1994a), and generally make it difficult to compare the effectiveness of new 
instruments with that of command and control, a methodological point which is discussed in 




























































































member states and stresses the need for proper instrument design along the lines 
discussed above (EC 1996a).
Ecolabels
Instead of taxes or direct regulation, many states have employed ecolabels, 
suasive tools designed to achieve similar pollution reduction indirectly by 
providing consumers with greater information about the environmental qualities 
of specific products. Polls suggest that many people prefer to buy green 
products when possible, and are even willing to pay a higher price for them; 
armed with proper information, these green consumers can reward 
environmentally friendlier brands with greater market share (van Goethem 
1992). But this becomes a perplexing task amidst the current deluge of 
advertisements extolling the environmental friendliness of nearly every 
available item. Ecolabelling schemes therefore involve harmonised or 
standardised procedures and logotypes, often with third party evaluation, all of 
which allows consumers to distinguish between “greenwash” and legitimate 
environmental claims.10
Within the EC, national ecolabels have proliferated since the late 1970s, and 
consumers were eventually confronted in shops with the German Blue Angel 
(1978), the Scandinavian White Swan (1989), and the French “NF- 
Environnement” label (1992), to name just a few. While these national labels 
achieved a certain level of success, encouraging greener consumption patterns 
in several member states (particularly in Sweden, as Eiderstrom notes), they 
also generated some environmental and economic problems in the context of 
extensive intra-EC trade. Not only did it become increasingly difficult for 
shoppers to discern the merits of competing official labels, so that they would 
trust a local label regardless of the standards it represented, but the fact that 
national labelling criteria could be used to discriminate against other EC 
producers threatened to undermine the common market. States can easily adjust 
their label criteria to favour domestic products and production processes. And 
even without discrimination, EC producers of green products wanting to 
penetrate neighbouring markets faced enormous transaction costs from having 
to make separate applications for each national ecolabel.
Many argued that a single European-wide ecolabel would resolve these 
problems, and it was against this background that the “EU Flower” was adopted
*9 One interesting solution was a 1991 Belgian policy which allowed a tribunal to suspend 





























































































in 1992. However, as Eiderstrom discusses in his paper, the scheme has been 
plagued by considerable disagreement within the Commission as well as 
amongst member states over the development of criteria for individual products. 
The Commission has undertaken reforms to streamline the process, but as of 
mid-1997 only five standards had been adopted.
Experience with the EU Flower and various national programmes highlights 
the fact that, like green taxes and voluntary agreements, the effectiveness of 
ecolabels hinges on resolving contentious matters of instrument design. Most 
importantly, there must be consensus on the criteria for conferring an ecolabel: 
will they reward the reduction of pollution caused during the production 
process, the omission or inclusion of certain product ingredients, or the 
curtailing of environmental damage caused during the product’s use and 
disposal? The so-called “cradle to grave” approach, which applies life cycle 
assessment (LCA), represents an attempt to synthesise, rather then arbitrarily 
weight these factors. Nevertheless, intense debate has arisen amongst member 
states and with the EU’s trading partners over how to apply LCA properly.
Like voluntary agreements, openness and transparency is also critical in the 
design of ecolabel programmes. When all interested parties enjoy access to the 
criteria setting process, ecolabels can improve the legitimacy of environmental 
policy by substituting direct consumer and NGO involvement for the agency 
capture found so frequently under command and control. According to 
Eiderstrom, many national ecolabels, as well as the EU Flower, fail to deliver 
adequate transparency because criteria are devised within standardisation bodies 
or under other conditions where access to information is dominated by industry. 
Guaranteeing sufficient access to a wide range of firms, both large and small, 
domestic and foreign, is also an important factor in building legitimacy and 
averting trade distortions.
As with many of the new instruments discussed in this volume, ecolabels 
encounter serious legal impediments with EU and WTO rules. A diversity of 
national labels, each of which adopts a different form of LCA and neglects 
access and appeals procedures for firms in neighbouring EU states, will almost 
certainly generate trade barriers and violations of the treaty’s rules on 
competition. In lieu of a convergence amongst national instrument design and 
criteria procedures, the imposition of the EU Flower as a common ecolabel 
might avert some of these EU legal problems. In an international context 
governed by WTO rules, however, convergence (or the use of a single ecolabel) 
might have to include non-EU states, because the EU Flower itself has been 





























































































Even if it were possible to surmount the legal and economic obstacles 
discussed above, it remains unclear whether the optimal environmental solution 
consists of a single EU label or continued national diversity. Having already 
made substantial commitments to national labelling schemes, will consumers 
and industry see the value of an EU label? Even if this means suspending well- 
known schemes such as the Blue Angel and White Swan while protracted 
debate continues over the EU Flower?11
Ecoaudits
Environmental management systems (EMAS), often referred to as ecoaudits, are 
a second type of entirely voluntary suasive instrument. They work as follows: in 
exchange for official government confirmation of their efforts, firms undertake 
a comprehensive assessment of their production processes and commit 
themselves to achieving steady improvement in environmental performance. 
Confirmation comes in the form of a certificate that a firm has met a certain 
standard of environmental management. Standards have developed at a national 
level within the EU-for example the British standard-as well as at the 
supranational level, where work on ISO ecomanagement criteria preceded the 
adoption of an EU EMAS.
Taschner’s analysis (WP RSC 98/21) makes clear, however, that NGOs 
remain somewhat ambivalent about the merits of EMAS. She cautions that 
ecoaudits often include a myriad of loopholes, and that even when these can be 
remedied EMAS must not provide an excuse for the dismantling of more 
demanding forms of environmental regulation. As with ecolabel schemes, 
NGOs are also critical of the process whereby EMAS criteria develop within 
standardisation bodies which lack transparency and are dominated by industry.
Here again instrument design and accommodating diversity within the EU 
and global trade context emerge as the two problematic issues. In terms of 
design, there has been considerable disagreement over which “experts” are 
qualified to perform the tasks of verifying and certifying industrial compliance 
with ecoaudit standards. While independent certifiers who maintain an arms- 
length relationship with industry might have incentives for more rigorous 
oversight, they could lack the technical sector-specific expertise to perform 
their task properly, whereas certification by a self-administering industrial body
' * Eiderstrom argues that states shouldn’t be forced to wait for EU consensus on LCA, 




























































































might provide greater technical competence but runs a high risk of regulatory 
capture and clientelism.
Diversity amongst the various member state ecoaudit programmes, and the 
attendant risk of market distortion and consumer confusion, generated demand 
for some form of coordination. Options include widespread use of a single 
national standard, universal adoption of the EU’s own EMAS, or a consensus in 
favour of a global ISO standard. Environmental groups favour the second 
option because ISO standards are considerably less demanding than EMAS (WP 
RSC 98/21). Within the EU states have disagreed over the merits of worldwide 
harmonisation on the basis of a single ISO ecoaudit standard, the superior 
environmental characteristics versus the potential competitive disadvantages 
flowing from EMAS, and the legality of strict EU ecoaudit standards under 
GATT/WTO rules. For the moment, therefore, a fourth option has prevailed: in 
response to industry demands, EMAS regulation was altered to allow 
certification of sites which met national or international standards deemed to 
“correspond” with EMAS. This requires “bridging” their differences, and has 
resulted in serious problems of demonstrating equivalence between different 
ecoaudit standards.
In terms of effectiveness, ecoaudits might have illuminated some cost 
cutting opportunities for firms, but have these firms fulfilled their promise of 
steady environmental improvement? Generalisations are difficult because 
EMAS does not yet enjoy widespread use, so any environmental improvements 
that did result from this instrument are certainly not pervasive throughout the 
EU, while many national schemes are too recent to assess their effects. 
Nevertheless, available evidence suggests considerable room for improvement. 
In fact, as of 1997 firms in Germany comprised a staggering 70% of all the 
EMAS registrations given out since 1993. Moreover, nearly all the firms which 
sought certification already met the standards, so even where it has been used it 
is questionable whether EMAS has exerted pressure for steady improvement.
One factor limiting the environmental effectiveness of current ecoaudit 
schemes, as well as their legitimacy, is a lack of transparency. Public statements 
required from firms under the terms of EMAS are not very demanding, making 
it difficult for interested parties to gauge compliance with environmental targets 
or the scope for possible industrial improvement. Encouraging firms to reveal 
additional information has not been easy because of the serious risk that it could 
be used against them; transparency increase the chances of being found liable 
for violating current or previous environmental laws. Indeed, Taschner argues 
that EMAS is only valuable if accompanied by other regulatory instruments, 




























































































that EMAS statements often fail even to provide the required information. 
Evidence from Germany, Belgium and Spain also suggests that ecoaudits create 
widespread disincentives for firms to reveal information because doing so can 
lead to prosecution (WP RSC 98/14, 98/16, and 98/17). Alert to the tension 
between information provision and self-incrimination, environmental NGOs, 
industrial groups and local authorities are now faced with the broader question 
of whether ecoaudit schemes require or preclude liability regimes. The issue is 
ever more pressing in countries where liability and insurance schemes are 
themselves becoming increasingly popular instruments of environmental 
protection (Spain and Germany).
Tradable permits
Much of the literature on new environmental instruments focuses on systems of 
tradable permits which establish competitive markets amongst firms for 
emissions “credits” originally allocated by the government. Because firms have 
strong incentives to reduce their pollution levels and sell excess credits to less 
efficient competitors, tradable permit systems can reduce the overall compliance 
costs of achieving a given level of environmental protection, and induce 
technological development which facilitates steadily greener production. 
Compared to the US, where permit systems have been widely used with 
considerable economic success (Dudek and Willey 1994, Hahn 1995), the EU 
has limited experience with this type of new instrument and its advantages have 
yet to materialise. Cremer and Fisahn cite one of the few available examples, 
where the poor design of Germany’s permit system for air pollution undermined 
its environmental success, and monitoring costs were found to equal those of a 
command and control approach (WP RSC 98/14). The UK has a de facto 
tradable permit system for reducing S02 emissions but it has yet to be 
formalised; until then, no clear assessments of its effectiveness are possible 
(WP RSC 98/13). Beyond the national level, various types of tradable permit 
systems are currently under consideration, including ones which would 
incorporate Asian states (Heller 1998).
Situating EU Developments in their Global Context
This series reveals that new instruments have found only moderate use within 
the EU and have achieved relatively limited economic and environmental 
results. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to characterise the EU’s 
supranational institutions, and certainly the fifteen Member States, as 
international laggards in policy innovation. In fact, viewed in a global context 
against the records of advanced industrialised states such as the US and Japan, 




























































































The US certainly leads in the use of certain instruments such as tradable 
permits, which were introduced in the 1970s and expanded in the 1980s, but in 
general its environmental policies remain dominated by a traditional command 
and control approach based on technology standards. And even with permits, 
while schemes for SO2, VOC, CO, NO„, and lead reduction constitute notable 
success stories, “outside the air-pollution field, there are virtually no serious 
examples of decentralised, market-like approaches to pollution control that are 
in actual operation” (Burtraw and Portney 1991:301; Hahn 1995). On green 
taxes, the US has hardly distinguished itself as an international standard bearer 
despite highly publicised Congressional reports in 1989 and 1991 supporting 
their widespread use (Freeman 1994). Some individual US states have 
implemented taxes on various forms of waste disposal, as well as deposit-refund 
programmes to encourage recycling, but similar policies are found at least as 
frequently in Europe. Moreover, environmental levies and incentive taxes are 
often higher in EU Member States than in the US (Hahn 1995:145), and the 
proportion of total revenue derived from green taxes has been consistently much 
lower in the US than in most EU states (EEA 1996:51). Besides taxes and 
permits, the United States employs a broad portfolio of voluntary agreements 
with industry, most of which are run by the federal government and the 
Environmental Protection Agency, but the stringency and achievements of these 
programmes fall short of voluntary instruments in the EU. The modesty of their 
economic or environmental results stems from an absence of several design 
features identified as essential by Biekart-few US agreements contain actual 
targets and none are legally binding or backed by a strong regulatory threat 
(Storey 1996).
In contrast to both the EU and the USA, apart from a large number of 
voluntary agreements at the local level which have contributed to environmental 
protection (Rehbinder 1994, Storey 1996), new instruments have made almost 
no appearance in Japan. Rather, since its belated and symbolic inception in the 
early 1970s, Japanese environmental policy has relied almost exclusively on 
technological solutions mandated through command and control regulation 
(Tsuru and Weidner 1989, Maull 1992). The stringency of these emissions 
standards and quality objectives has increased rapidly, leading to substantial 
environmental improvements, and the accompanying Japanese abatement 
technologies governing air and waste pollution are now some of the most 
advanced in the world (Vogel 1993). However, unlike most other highly 
industrialised states, where the limitations of command and control have at least 
framed discussions of environmental policy reform and often lead to an actual 
broadening of the range of environmental instruments employed, for the most 
part Japanese authorities have retained an “uncritical obsession” for their 




























































































proposals in 1992 to establish a system of ecotaxes, for instance, encountered 
fierce opposition and were “relegated [by the government] to the status of a very 
general discussion paper” (Meves 1992:176).
International comparison places the EU record in a better light, but also raises 
an important question not directly addressed in this book: what explains 
international variation in instrument choice? The extent to which individual 
countries have departed from command and control as the dominant form of 
environmental policy probably depends upon a wide range of factors, including 
the preferences of environmental NGOs, the attitude of industrial groups, the 
influence of individual politicians and scientists, the position of nations within 
larger organisations (particularly the EU), and the institutional structure of the 
state. The latter presents a particularly intriguing area for further study. While 
institutional considerations play a secondary role in the overall extent of a 
nation’s environmental regulation, the contributions to this series and the record 
of countries such as the USA and Japan suggest that they might play a more 
substantial role in explaining cross-national variation in instrument selection.12 
All states have retained command and control as their primary framework, but 
the relatively widespread adoption of new environmental instruments in 
Germany, Belgium, and the USA (and their relative absence in Japan and 
Britain) could reflect the scope afforded by federalism for experimentation at 
the regional and local level.
Conclusions
Does experience support the case for widespread use of new environmental 
instruments? Has their success distinguished them as viable alternatives to 
traditional forms of regulation? The papers draw attention to the risks of 
answering either of these questions prematurely, and indicate some of the 
fundamental considerations which will guide environmental policymaking in 
the EU through a difficult time of transition.
With little evidence of governments actually dismantling command and 
control, it is methodologically difficult to determine the full benefits of new 
tools or their dependency on other instruments. For example, the much 
publicised shift to unleaded petrol, usually attributed to the effects of green 
taxes, was accompanied throughout Europe by command and control
'2 In his study of Great Britain, the USA and Japan, Vogel finds that varying intensity of 
public opinion best explains cross-national differences in the extent and timing of 




























































































requirements to equip cars with catalytic converters. These devices require the 
use of unleaded petrol, and contributed enormously to changing consumption 
patterns. Similarly, decreasing water pollution and improved sewage tfeatment 
in Germany and the Netherlands has resulted as much from command and 
control rules as from the use of taxes. Like green taxes, other new instruments 
have almost invariably been applied in the EU as merely one tool within a 
package, supplementing pre-existing command and control regulation. Without 
counterfactuals, which are difficult to construct and rarely offered by 
proponents of deregulation, one is hard pressed to conclude that in practice new 
instruments are actually superior to traditional environmental policies. In some 
cases new instruments have actually retarded environmental progress which 
might have been made through traditional command and control mechanisms 
(WP RSC 98/19).
One must also consider the argument that heavy reliance on new instruments 
could undermine society’s quest for sufficient environmental protection by 
“locking in” the wrong philosophical approach—one which worships at the alter 
of free market forces (Eckersley 1993, 1995:12). To take one example from 
Eiderstrom (WP RSC 98/20), ecolabels reward greener brands, but they also 
legitimate rather than discourage consumption. Green consumerism by itself 
will not fulfil the promises made in the Rio Summit’s Agenda 21 for a 
fundamental reduction in global resource consumption. What is needed, this 
argument suggests, is an approach guided by pragmatism rather than 
deregulatory zeal, for market instruments require a “sustainable ecological 
context in which [the market’s] virtue, efficiency, can shine.” Otherwise, 
without sufficiently ambitious environmental targets set by government 
regulation, “an efficient servant will become an unjust and unsustainable 
master” (Daly 1993:182). This context is currently lacking in the member 
states-German and Dutch environmental targets are some of the toughest in the 
EU, but even these do not reflect sustainability objectives (WP RSC 98/14, 
Collier and Golub 1997).
Even if appropriate targets were devised, would a commitment to new 
instruments make environmental policy a hostage of government procrastination 
and industry hypocrisy? As many of the papers point out, industry frequently 
praises new tools in theory as part of an effort to remove regulation, but then in 
practice opposes their adoption. Proposals for UK road taxes have languished, 
as have many national energy taxes, while in the Netherlands, planned use of 
voluntary agreements has postponed the possibility of more concrete 




























































































All of this suggests that we need packages of tools, new and old, but in 
which combination? While there is general agreement that policymakers must 
combine the incentives and technology inducing aspects of new instruments 
with direct regulation guaranteeing information and transparency (Heyvaert 
1997), in many cases the appropriate mix of tools remains unclear: how, for 
instance, can elements of command and control such as BAT possibly coexist 
with taxes or tradable permits without sacrificing their flexibility and 
efficiency? Recent EU framework directives on air and water pollution, and on 
integrated pollution prevention (1PPC) illustrate this problem. Each of these 
laws sought to establish common environmental targets across Europe while 
leaving member states free to select efficient means of achieving pollution 
reduction. But this flexibility was simultaneously undermined by the 
Parliament’s (and Commission’s) inclusion of BAT provisions in the proposals, 
a move which drew considerable resistance from industry and resulted in heated 
debate over alternative and more vaguely worded provisions (European 
Environment 8 October 1996, 11 June 1996, 31 May 1996).13 Moreover, there 
are discouraging signs that appropriate environmental policy packages will only 
become more difficult to fashion, as some states curtail access to information 
and enforcement mechanisms (WP RSC 98/14).
One of the most challenging implications to emerge from this volume is the 
need to reconsider how we judge the “effectiveness” of new instruments, which 
in turn raises important questions about proper environmental policy design. 
While the staunchest advocates promise simultaneous cost savings, 
environmental improvement and political legitimacy from the arsenal of new 
instruments, in fact these might represent conflicting goals which trade-off 
against each other and, not surprisingly, are prioritised and championed 
differently by industry, government and green groups. The three papers written 
by representatives of green NGOs, for example, paint a rather pessimistic 
picture of the environmental gains actually achieved so far by ecolabels, 
voluntary agreements and ecoaudits. They suggest that these instruments appeal 
to and enjoy legitimacy within industry partly because they have been designed 
in a manner which emphasises flexibility and compliance cost reduction at the 
expense of ambitious pollution control. Presumably, in a world where new 
instruments conformed to the ideals of environmental NGOs, it would not be 
unlikely to find analogous accounts written by industry representatives 
deploring an insensitivity to cost-cutting considerations.
O In the US, federal air pollution laws which require application of Maximally Achievable 
Control Technology have created similar impediments for flexible environmental instruments 




























































































Incompatibility between the three aspects of “effectiveness” is a recurring 
theme which policymakers will have to address when weighing the respective 
benefits of new and old regulatory tools. For example, even if one 
acknowledges their economic merits (which in most cases is highly 
controversial), new instruments can be as anti-democratic as command and 
control measures (Dryzek 1995), as demonstrated by the Dutch water tax which 
excluded from negotiations those primarily affected (WP RSC 98/15). On the 
other hand, while the Dutch decentralised regional approach provides greater 
political legitimacy, by expanding the range of actors involved it creates serious 
collective action problems which might reduce efficiency, limit cost savings and 
prevent environmental gains.
The development of new instruments, either alongside or as a replacement 
for command and control measures, also has profound implications for the 
nature of governance, as it requires balancing the advantages of national 
diversity with the need for uniform EU rules. In some cases, tailoring ecotaxes, 
voluntary agreements, and ecolabels to local conditions can improve both the 
efficiency and legitimacy of environmental policy. But in other cases, as the 
dissenting opinion in the Molitor report notes and Commission officials discuss 
in this volume, excessive EU deregulation aimed at facilitating national 
flexibility with new instruments merely shifts environmental problems to the 
national level and generates coordination problems, including serious disruption 
of the common market when national measures constitute trade barriers (EC 
1995:16 part 2).'«
In fact, the governance issue extends beyond the EU’s borders and raises 
important questions about the increasing interdependence of environmental and 
trade policies: even if it were possible to strike an appropriate balance between 
member state and EU authority, can a shift towards second generation 
instruments be reconciled with the maintenance of global free trade governed by 
GATT/WTO standards? (Golub 1998b, EC 1996b). If not, as ongoing disputes 
over ecolabels, ecoaudits and green taxes would seem to suggest, the EU will 
have to consider abandoning one of these objectives if it cant muster political 
support for reforming global trade rules.
*4 In many instances the Commission approves new national environmental measures which 
limit trade or include elements of state aid, but many cases are highly contentious. For 
examples showing the potential trade distorting effects of new instruments, including some of 
those discussed in this volume, see the following issues of E u ro p ea n  E n v iro n m en t:  8 October 
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